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Abstract 
 
This paper discusses the extent and the determinants of the internationalization of 
European inventive activity, between 1990 and 2005, using an innovative method to treat 
the information contained in the European Patent Office's Patstat database. We introduce a 
new set of indicators measuring internationalized patent applications that are fully coherent 
with the principle of fractional counting. The observed level of internationalization of 
inventive activities, while being rather low, has steadily increased over time.  
The amount of collaboration between actors residing in different countries is 
assessed by means of a gravity model. The amount of bilateral collaboration is positively 
affected by the presence of a common language, a common border and by more similar  
cultural characteristics. International collaboration is negatively affected by distance, with 
estimated elasticities that are significantly smaller than the ones that characterize 
international trade.  
 
Keywords: Internationalization; R&D; Patent statistics; Gravity model. 
                                                 
1  Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, 40123 Bologna. 
Email: lucio.picci@unibo.it, tel.: 0039-051-2092608, fax: 0039-051-2092664. I thank Marc 
Bogdanowicz, Gaétan De Rassenfosse, Albert Hu, Andrea De Panizza, Antoine Schoen, and Bruno 
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie for comments on a previous version of the paper. I’m grateful to 
participants to the World Bank Knowledge Economy Forum (Ancona, June 17-19, 2008), to the 
EPIP 2008 Conference (Bern, 3-4 October 2008), to the IPTS Workshop on patent statistics 
(Seville, 14-15 May 2009) for useful discussions. I thank James Fearon, Giuditta de Prato and Paola 
Sapienza for providing part of the data. 
 
2 
1. Introduction 
 
Almost all contemporary products are the result of some form of international 
collaboration and trade. A cell phone is a bundle of many components that, almost 
invariably, are produced in different countries. Raw materials are traded to such an extent 
that anything containing plastic or metal components is also very likely to be the result of 
international trade. As for services, the current lore on international outsourcing of back-
office routines indicates that internationalization, while not being preponderant, is certainly 
increasing. 
Innovative activities, on the other hand, are largely the result of efforts which take 
place in single countries. Almost twenty years ago, considering the patenting activities of a 
sample of big US firms, Patel and Pavitt (1991) observed that "in most cases, the(ir) 
technological activities […] are concentrated in their home country", and concluded that 
"despite being a critical resource in the global competition and performance of both 
companies and countries  […] the production of technology remains far from globalised."  
Since then, globalization has certainly made inroads into this domain, thanks to robust 
increases in international collaboration of various types, to the off-shoring of many R&D 
labs, and to advances in the protection and trade of intellectual property rights.  However, 
as we will demonstrate, it is still true that innovative activities are predominantly national 
in scope. 
This paper aims to identify the determinants of the intensity of international 
collaboration in inventive activities, and what they tell us about why the degree of 
internationalization of innovative activities is still relatively low. To address this issue, 
several researchers have exploited in various ways the information contained in patent data 
(see, among others, Patel and Pavitt, 1991; Patel and Vega, 1999, and Le Bas and Serra, 
2002). The research presented here also uses patents data. While most previous studies 
have considered the patent portfolios of (multinational) firms, here we attribute patents to 
countries, by exploiting the fact that patents data provide separate information on the 
nationality of the inventors and of the applicants. If a given patent involves only people and 
organizations residing in the same country, we define it as "national".  If, on the other hand, 
at least one inventor or one applicant resides in a country different from that of the others, 
then we call the patent "international". Moreover, the presence of an important functional 
distinction between inventors and applicants allows us to define and analyze different 
measures of internationalization. 
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We adopt a methodology to compute patent statistics focusing on all applications 
claiming the right to priority that are filed at any one of the EU27 national patent offices, 
the  European Patent Office (EPO), the United States Patent and Trade Mark Office 
(USPTO), or the Japanese patent office. Applications claiming the right to priority are those 
that are filed at a particular patent office for the first time. Focusing on them only is a 
possibility only recently made available, thanks to the Patstat  database (European Patent 
Office, 2009a and 2009b), which is the source of our data. The methodology used allows to 
control for the presence of the “home bias effect” (the tendency of residents of a country to 
file patent applications in their country's patent office), and is fully documented in De 
Rassenfosse et al. (2009). 
We adopt a gravity model to study the determinants of the intensity of collaboration 
between pairs of countries. The gravity model ("one of the more successful empirical 
models in economics", Frankel and Rose, 2002) has had remarkable success in explaining 
bilateral trade flows. It describes trade between two countries as increasing in their 
economic size, and as decreasing in their distance (hence the resemblance with Newton's 
gravity law). This model has been given several theoretical rationalizations, the first 
proposed by Anderson (1979).  Disdier and Head (2008) performed a meta-analysis on 103 
papers applying the gravity model and report a mean elasticity of bilateral trade with 
respect to distance of 0.9, "indicating that, on average, bilateral trade is nearly inversely 
proportionate to distance". They also show that distance effects "decreased slightly between 
1870 and 1950 and then began to rise". Besides the negative effect of distance, other 
variables have generally been found to positively determine bilateral trade, such as the 
presence of a common border, a common language, a common market, a common currency 
area (for the latter, see Rose, 2000, and Baldwin, 2006), and a higher level of mutual trust 
(Guiso et al., 2009)  The gravity model has been also applied to describe relations other 
than traditional trade in goods. In particular, distance effects have been found in the trade of 
services (Ceglowski, 2006, and Kimura and Lee, 2006), trade through the Internet (Blum 
and Goldfarb, 2006), knowledge flows through patent citations (Peri, 2005), immigration 
flows (for a recent example, see Lewer and Van den Berg, 2007), and also in fields outside 
economics.  
Our approach appears to have only one published antecedent, the paper of Guellec 
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001), who use measures of R&D internationalization 
similar to ours, which we introduce in the next section. One dimension in which this paper 
is innovative is in its treatment of patent information. We dedicate Section 3 to a 
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description of the data. In Section 4, we illustrate the empirical model and the main results, 
which we discuss in Section 5.  
 
2. Measures of internationalization 
 
To present our measures of internationalization, we first briefly review the 
familiar concept of fractional counting of patents (see for example Dernis et al., 2001). To 
help make the discussion as easy to follow as possible, we use a simple fictitious example. 
We consider three countries, United Stated (US), France (FR), and Germany (DE), that in a 
given year produce a total of P=3 patents. Column I in Table 1 indicates the nationality of 
the inventors and applicants that contributed to these three inventions.  
 
Table 1 about here 
  
In order to assign patents to countries, two alternative criteria may be chosen: 
either according to the nationality of the applicant(s), or of the inventor(s). The former 
defines the "applicant criterion" and the latter the "inventor criterion". Whenever an 
application has more than one inventor or applicant, some of them coming from different 
countries, patent assignment is carried out by resorting to fractional counts. So, for 
example, patent n. 1 counts as ½ German and ½ American according to the applicant 
criterion, and ½ American, ¼ German and ¼ French according to the inventor criterion. 
Let us call piInv ,  the fraction of patent p attributed to country i according to the 
inventor criterion, and piApp ,  the analogous measure according to the applicant criterion. 
Column II and III of Table 1 report these measures for the three patents. For each patent, 
the sum of all the country's contribution according to the inventor criterion has to be equal 
to 1: for each patent, pUSInv ,  + pDEInv ,  + pFRInv ,  = 1, where the first subscript indicates the 
country, and the second the patent (for clarity we use the mnemonic symbol of the relevant 
country, instead of i, and we omit a time subscript that should be present). These sums are 
indicated in Column IV of Table 1.   
The total fractional assignment of the three patents to each country is simply equal 
to the sum of the individual assignments:  
(1)    ∑==
P
p
ipi InvInv
1
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and: 
 (1')   ∑==
P
p
ipi AppApp
1
 
They are reported in the last two rows of Table 1. For example, Germany produced 
a total of 0.75 patents according to the inventor criterion, and of 0.5 patents according to 
the applicant criterion. 
Having defined the concept of fractional counting, we proceed to develop useful 
measures to express the degree of collaboration in producing patents between (the agents 
residing in) two countries. Again, we discuss them using the fictitious example of Table 1. 
We define three concepts of internationalization of a given patent: 
Inventor-Applicant internationalization (InvApp): Whenever a patent has (at 
least) one inventor and one applicant that come from different countries. All three patents 
of the example belong to this type. 
Inventor internationalization (in short, InvInv): Whenever a patent has at least 
two inventors resident in different countries. All three patents in our example display this 
type of internationalization. 
Applicant internationalization (AppApp): Whenever a patent has at least two 
applicants resident in different countries. Patent 1 and 2, but not patent 3, display this type 
of internationalization. 
InvApp is the more general type of internationalization. In fact, the presence of 
InvInv implies InvApp – if there are two inventors from different countries, then it is also 
necessarily true that one inventor and one applicant are from different countries. Similarly, 
AppApp implies InvApp. All international patents are necessarily of the InvApp type, and 
possibly also of the InvInv and/or of the AppApp type.  
There are some forms of international inventive effort that our measures may fail 
to detect. Consider a multinational corporation (from country A) acquiring a firm abroad (in 
country B) with a long record of patenting its innovations at country B's patent office. Our 
measures would not define this activity as “international”, unless at least one inventor is 
from outside country B, possibly from the headquarters in country A. However, it may in 
fact be appropriate not to consider the case as an example of internationalization of 
inventive activity (possibly, as opposed to a case of internationalization of productive 
activity), considering that these inventions are not necessarily shared with headquarters.2 
                                                 
2 I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this possibility. 
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A further case of interest applies when a firm owns a R&D unit in a foreign 
country, producing an invention with the help of inventors that are all resident in that same 
location. If, moreover, the applicant of the filing is the foreign subsidiary (instead of the 
firm’s headquarters), then all the applicants and the inventors would be from the same 
country and therefore the patent application, according to our taxonomy, would fall into the 
"national" category. However, multinational corporations tend to file through their 
headquarters (a fact that is also supported by evidence that we present in Table 3 below). 
Moreover, even when they file through a foreign subsidiary, given the international scope 
of the firm, it would be likely that at least one inventor is from another country, and also the 
filing could be done jointly with another subsidiary in a different country, so that the patent 
would be classified as international. 
Another case of internationalization that would go undetected is when two firms 
from different countries constitute a joint R&D effort in one of the two countries, or in a 
third country, and produce an invention where all the inventors are residents of the country 
where the jointly-owned firm is registered. Arguably, there should not be very many of 
these cases.  
Having discussed the general concepts of Inventor, Applicant, and Inventor-
Applicant internationalization, we now proceed to define the related measures, starting with 
the first one. For each patent, the strength of the relation between inventors in country i and 
j is expressed as the product of the attribution of that patent to the two countries: 
 
(2)    jpipijp InvInvInvInv ⋅=  
 
This measure attributes a greater weight to collaborations where the two countries 
have more similar weights. So, for example, the collaboration between the US and France 
is equal to ½ · ¼ = 1/8 in patent n. 1 (where there are 1 French and 2 American inventors) 
and to ½ · ½ in patent 3 (where the total number of inventors, 2, is equally divided between 
the US and France. In fact, if i is different from j, 4/10 ≤≤ ijpInvInv , where the upper bound 
is reached when the total number of inventors is equally divided between two countries, 
and the lower limit applies when a patent is national. 
The aggregate strength of the relation between the inventors of two countries is 
defined as the sum of the above, over all patents: 
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3)     ∑==
P
p
ijpij InvInvInvInv
1
 
 
Below, we report the values for all the combinations of the three patents in Table 
1, where for clarity, instead of the indexes i and j, the acronyms of the countries are 
employed.  
5.05.05.0005.05.0, =⋅+⋅+⋅=USUSInvInv   
125.05.005.0025.05.0, =⋅+⋅+⋅=DEUSInvInv  
375.05.05.00025.05.0, =⋅+⋅+⋅=FRUSInvInv  
 
The top part of Table 2 shows the values of these interactions for all three cases. 
Note that jiij InvInv =  (the order of the countries is irrelevant). Using (1), it is easy to see 
that:  
 
(4)   j
N
i
ij InvInvInv =∑
=1
  and    i
N
j
ij InvInvInv =∑
=1  
 
For example, as predicted by (4): 
USFRUSDEUSUSUS InvInvInvInvInvInvInv ==++=++ 1375.0125.05.0,,,  
These sums are reported for all three countries in the last column and in the last rows of the 
top part of Table 2, and correspond to the values reported in Table 1. They show that the 
country patent portfolio, assigned according to the inventor criterion, may be expressed as a 
sum of pairwise measures of country inventive collaboration (InvInvij). 
The measure of applicant internationalization is constructed along the same lines, 
and the following formulae hold: 
 
(2')      jpipijp AppAppAppApp ⋅=  
(3')      ∑==
P
p
ijpij AppAppAppApp
1
 
(4')      j
N
i
ij AppAppApp =∑
=1  and i
N
j
ij AppAppApp =∑
=1   
 
All computations for this case are shown in the middle part of Table 2. Note that 
jiij AppApp =  (again, the order of the countries is irrelevant). Equation (4') allows us to 
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express a country patent portfolio, according to the applicant criterion, as a sum of 
interactions between applicants in different countries. The values reported in the last 
column and row of the middle part of Table 2 correspond to those of Table 1. 
 
We construct a measure of Inventor-Applicant internationalization similarly. The 
strength of the collaboration between inventors in country i and applicants in country j, for 
a single patent p, is defined as: 
 
(5) jpipijp AppInvInvApp ⋅=  
 
Summing over patents provides a measure of the strength of the overall 
collaboration between country i inventors and country j applicants: 
 
(6) ∑==
P
p
ijpij InvAppInvApp
1
 
 
These measures aggregate to the patent attributed to a country either according to 
the inventor, or to the applicant criterion, depending on whether the summation is over i, or 
over j: 
(7)    i
ij
N
j
InvInvApp =∑
=1  
(7')    j
ij
N
i
AppInvApp =∑
=1  
 
The bottom part of Table 2 indicates all computations for our fictitious example. 
Note that ijInvApp  generally differs from jiInvApp . 
 
The quantities defined in (3), (3’) and (6) are the three measures of 
internationalization of innovative activities that we will assess in Section 4 using a gravity 
model. In the next section, in order to provide a first description of the degree of 
internationalization, we will use measures of internationalization that are relative to the 
total number of patent applications. Starting from (3) and (3’), the necessary computations 
are straightforward: 
(8)     iijiij InvInvInvInv /=          
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 and     
(8')   iijiij AppAppAppApp /=  
where  1
1
=∑
=
iij
N
j
InvInv   and   1
1
=∑
=
iij
N
j
AppApp . 
In the case of (6), we can compute two relative measures, depending on whether 
the normalization is carried out with respect to the inventors of country i, or to the 
applicants of country j: 
  
(9)    iijiij InvInvAppInvApp /=  
(9')    jijjij AppInvAppInvApp /=  
 
where  1
1
=∑
= iij
N
j
InvApp   and   1
1
=∑
= jij
N
i
InvApp . 
 
Our metrics of relative internationalization have similarities with those of Guellec 
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001), who adopt three measures that they call SHAI, 
SHIA, and SHII. The first one is similar to our (9), the second to (9'), and the third to (8). 
Our measure (8') has no analogue in their paper. Our measures have three main advantages 
on others that have been employed in the literature (see also OECD, 2008). First, we use 
fractional counting so as to count as "more international" those patents where international 
collaboration is more pronounced. Secondly, the appropriate use of fractional counting 
allows to decompose a patent portfolio as a sum of pairwise internationalization linkages, 
plus a fully national component (equations 4, 4’, 7 and 7’). Thirdly, contemplating all 
possible types of internationalization, as they may be detected using patent data, allows to 
compute alternative measures whose contrast may be informative. 
 
3. The data 
 
We consider patent applications, not granted patents. This choice, besides being a 
common practice in the literature, has the advantage of allowing an analysis of more recent 
data, considering that several years typically elapse between the filing and the granting of a 
patent. The source of the data is the Patstat database, based on the EPO's "master 
bibliographic database DocDB" (European Patent Office, 2009a and 2009b), and covers 
data from more than 80 patent offices. An important and innovative characteristic of Patstat 
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is that it allows the identification of patent applications that claim the right to priority (that 
is, it permits us to distinguish between multiple applications for the same inventions in 
several patent offices). We take full advantage of this characteristic and we only consider 
"priority" applications.  
Most studies on patents only use information from a single patent office. Given 
our focus on the internationalization of patents, this approach would not be viable, because 
the presence of the "home bias effect" would vitiate any study based on a single, even if 
very important, national patent office. For this reason, we consider applications filed in any 
one of the patent offices of a member state of the European Union (in its current 
configuration of 27 States, EU27), at the EPO, the USPTO and the Japanese Patent Office. 
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001) and OECD (2008) focus their attention 
on the filings to the EPO only, a strategy that rests on its continental scope. However, such 
a choice also is questionable, for two reasons. First, many European patents never reach the 
EPO as priority filings, or as successive applications. Secondly, the decision to file to the 
EPO is influenced by factors that are country-dependent. In particular, agents from smaller 
countries, which have been members of the EPO for longer and whose national patent 
offices have higher filing fees, have a higher propensity to use that institution (De 
Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2007).The two reasons together imply 
that only focusing on the EPO may induce biased estimates. Using data from the EPO only 
(or from one or few national patent offices, as in the triadic approach – see Dernis and 
Khan, 2004) was also a matter of convenience and, until some time ago, it was almost 
unavoidable. With the availability of the Patstat database, better alternatives have become 
available.  
The Patstat database, however, while being very innovative, is still in its infancy, 
and the data of each patent office require careful analysis and often ad-hoc treatment in 
order to be included. The choice of the patent offices to be included was made considering 
a trade-off between considering more offices, and the high incremental costs to be incurred 
to check the quality of the data and to make any corrections that may be necessary. The 
methodology employed is fully documented in de Rassenfosse et al (2009). Out of all 
applications filed at the selected patent offices between 1990 and 2005 (a total of 
8,260,081),  224,911 are international according to our classification.  
 
    Table 3 about here 
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Table 3 documents some relevant characteristic of these international patents. We 
consider first its last line, that reports the frequency of the types of internationalization. 
About 56% of the international patents do not display any other type of internationalization 
besides the InvApp (only) type. The other international patents also manifest some other 
type of internationalization. The most frequent occurrence is of patents that are both of the 
InvApp and of the InvInv type (about 31% of the total). The cases involving AppApp 
internationalization are relatively infrequent (last two columns). 
Next, we ask ourselves about the nature of the applicants. Unfortunately, besides 
reporting their names, patent statistics tell us nothing about their nature – be them national 
or multinational firms, universities, etc. The only way to find out is to carry out individual 
searches, a task that would obviously be too demanding if it were to be conducted on the 
whole group of about 225 thousand international patent applications. As a compromise, we 
selected selected a stratified random sample of 1,000 units, with proportional allocation in 
the year variable. For each one of them, we determined (using Internet searches and, in a 
few cases of doubt, the Amadeus business registry) the type of applicant(s), according to 
the following classification. 
"Multinational Enterprises" (MNEs) are firms that control at least one production 
unit in a country different from where they are based. We do not distinguish between 
headquarters and those subsidiaries that may be present in the same country as heaquarters 
(both are indicated as HQ). “Subsidiaries” (SUB) are firms controlled by MNEs and located 
in a country different from that of the headquarters. "Firms" are all firms that are not (part 
of) a MNE. "Universities" include all universities, and "Public research institutes" are 
research institutions that are primarily financed by public administrations (in all cases 
considered, they are also publicly owned, and clearly public in nature).  
The rest of Table 3 refers to results computed on the sample of 1000 patents. The  
last but one row reports the type of internationalization of the patent applications contained 
in the sample, with differences with respect to the population total that are due to sampling 
error. Each column reports the relative frequencies of the type of applicant conditional on 
the type of internationalization (note that the sum of the percentages by columns is always 
equal to 100%). Around 84% of the patents that are only of the InvApp type (and not of the 
InvInv and/or AppApp type) are the result of the activity of MNE. In most cases, MNE file 
through their headquarters, the only exception being for patents of the InvApp and AppApp 
type, that, implying collaboration of firms in distint countries, not surprisingly involve a 
higher number of MNE foreign subsidiaries. In general, relatively few of the applications 
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are carried out by firms (or other entities) that are not (part of) MNE. Applications from 
MNE headquarters are of decreasing importance as we move in the table from left to right. 
A Pearson 2χ  test shows that the relative importance of each type of applicant is not 
independent of the type of internationalization, implying that the differences that we have 
commented upon, as a whole, are statistically significant.  
To assess the overall degree of internationalization of inventive activity, we 
compute the relative measures of internationalization defined by Equations 8, 8', 9 and 9' of 
the previous section, for EU27, the United States and Japan, on all applications filed 
between 1990 until 2005. The data for EU27 are computed as a weighted average of the 
country level data, with weights equal to the relative size of patent portfolio of each country 
(computed according to the inventor criterion). The results are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
All measures indicate a degree of internationalization that is still rather modest, 
even though it has increased steadily since the early 1990s. The European country average 
indicates the highest level of internationalization, around 8% for InvApp 
internationalization at the end of the period. The United States showed a marked increase in 
internationalization in the 1990s, with levels roughly constant in the last few years. Japan 
has a very low share of international patents, reflecting both a reduced degree of 
internationalization of Japanese R&D, and a very high propensity to patent of Japanese 
entities.  
We also observe important differences among the four alternative metrics, with the 
two relative measures of inventor-applicant internationalization being well above the 
others. The first of the two (indicated in the Figure as InvApp | Inv) refers to patents that 
have national inventors and extra-national applicants, and InvApp | App the opposite. Let's 
focus on the case of Europe. The typical case accounted for by the InvApp | Inv measure is 
the one of a foreign MNE owning an R&D lab in a European country and filing the patents 
produced there through its headquarters in the home country. The fact that the first measure 
is higher than the second indicates the relatively high importance of foreing applicants in 
European inventive activity. The opposite happens for the United States, indicating a pre-
eminence of US applicants abroad.  
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Overall, these data allow us to declare that the degree of "globalization" in the 
production of technology, to refer again to the work of Patel and Pavitt (1991), has 
increased since the time when they wrote, but is still rather low in relative terms.  
 
4. A gravity model of international inventive activity 
 
The basic model that we estimate is the following: 
 
ijtjtitijtijjtitijt DDLdistAAINT εββλββββ +++++++= 543210 )ln()ln()ln()ln(  
where ln is the natural log, INT is one of the three bilateral measures of internationalization 
of inventive activity (equations 3, 3' or 6), A is the "inventive mass" of country i or j, that  
we proxy it with Invi or j and Appi or j (the total country patent portfolio, see equations 1 and 
1'). Dist is the distance between the capital cities of pairs of countries (computed with the 
great circle formula) and L is a vector of other conditioning variables. It includes Border, a 
dummy for the presence of common borders, dummies for the inclusion in the European 
Union (Eu Union) and in the European Monetary Union (Euro Zone), and Com lang, a 
variable representing the presence of a common language (see the Appendix for a 
description, and data sources, of this variable and of the following ones). In L we also 
include Tech, an indicator of pairwise "inventive proximity", computed as the  correlation 
between two vectors, one for each country, formed by the number of patent priority 
applications in each of the eight technology classes according to the International Patent 
Classification.  
It is quite likely that the costs of travel alone are not able to explain any effect that 
physical distance may have – just as they do not fully explain the negative effect of distance 
on international trade. It could well be that what really matters is a broad concept of 
cultural distance. The success of R&D activities rests upon the smooth functioning of many 
tasks that are not limited to research activities proper, but also include, for example, the 
building of the necessary infrastructure and the protection of the intellectual assets that are 
eventually produced. Since the necessary mutual understanding among all parties involved 
may be guaranteed only in part through contractual arrangements, tacit agreements end up 
playing an important role. Arguably, the further away two cultures are, the more difficult it 
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is for tacit agreements to be honored, and the more problematic is collaboration.3 In order to 
assess the role of cultural differences, we include among the regressors some variables that 
should capture these effects.  
We consider first a survey-based quantification on mutual trust between countries, 
Trust, that originates from one of the questions contained in the Eurobarometer survey. The 
variable Lang sim describes language similarity, and takes higher values for languages that 
share more common “branches”. Note that Lang sim is certainly correlated with Com lang, 
but it conveys different information. Com lang is meant to capture ease of communication 
(commonality of the language spoken in a couple of countries), while Lang sim is meant to 
proxy cultural proximity, imagining that persons whose languages share common roots also 
indicate the presence of more similar cultural traits. Religion sim is computed as the 
probability that two persons in different countries share the same broad religious group. 
Somatic dist is based on the weighted average of four distinct somatic characteristics. These 
last two variables are available only for a group of 14 countries (all of them current member 
of the European Union, plus Norway – See the Appendix). 
We expect the degree of protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRij) (the index 
of patent rights of Park, 2008) to influence choices of internationalization. On the one hand, 
better IPR protection favors international collaboration, since it limits the possibility that 
ideas, by travelling the distance, get stolen. However, facing a deficient IPR protection at 
home may induce important firms to locate their R&D activities in countries affording 
better protection. Also, inventors in a country affording poor IPR protection may have a 
further stimulus to look for employment in the R&D labs of multinational corporation, that 
can shield themselves better by patenting their inventions through their headquarters. 
Adding to the subtlety of the issue, we should consider that the relation between IPR 
protection and inventive activities is endogenous, because multinational corporations are 
likely to lobby for stronger IPR, both at home and, depending on their degree of 
internationalization, abroad. 
We also consider measures of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). We use a set of 
eight variables, expressing, for each country in a pair, flows or stock, inward or outward. 
                                                 
3  A survey of senior executives representing a wide range of industries, carried out by The 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2007), indicated “cultural differences” as the third most important risk 
to developing global innovation networks (the first and the second one being, respectively, theft of 
intellectual property, and loss of control over innovation processes).  
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The source of the data, expressed at current US Dollars4 at current prices and exchange 
rates, is UNCTAD (2009). These measures represent FDI regardless of its motives, and we 
should expect that only a small component is dedicated to R&D activities abroad. 
Moreover, the measures are aggregate also in the sense that no distinction on the recipient 
or source country is made.  
Last, we include a series of country-specific fixed effects, one for each country and 
year – the two D variables. This specification is quite flexible, including all possible fixed 
effects, short of estimating a Fixed-Effects panel model. The presence of a year dummy 
interacted with the country dummies is coherent with the discussion in Baldwin and 
Taglioni (2006). We estimate the basic model using data on pairwise collaboration between 
countries that are directly computed from our set of about 225 thousand international 
patents. We compute all bilateral ties for a total of 42 countries (see the Appendix), and we 
also consider a subgroup of 14 countries, all of them European, for which the Trust and 
Somatic dist variables are available. The maximum number of pairwise linkages is 
TNN ⋅−⋅ )1( , where N is the number of countries (either 42 or 14), and T the number of 
years under consideration (16, from 1990 until 2005). The actual number of observations 
used will in fact be sensibly smaller, due to the presence of many zero pairwise linkages, 
that the logarithmic transformation transforms into missing values. The presence of a 
limited number of further missing values is due to the incomplete coverage of the FDI data. 
 
We obtain our main results using the OLS estimator. Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006) argue that the nature of the estimation problem in a gravity model may induce a 
form of heteroskedasticity of the error term that, due to the log transformation of the data, 
leads to the inconsistency of the OLS estimator. They argue that a Poisson estimator is not 
prone to the problem (see also Martínez-Zarzoso et al., 2009, for a critical appraisal of the 
suggested approach). Estimates obtained using this method, that we report in Table A.1 in 
the Appendix, do not differ sensibly from the OLS results. In commenting them, we will 
indicate the few instances when the two methods lead to different conclusions.  
Table 4 shows the estimates of the gravity model for the three types of 
internationalizations. In interpreting the results, note that same variables indexed i and j 
will have estimated coefficients that are numerically the same when explaining InvInv or 
                                                 
4  The nature of the dummy variables included – see below – makes unnecessary expressing 
these quantities at constant prices. 
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AppApp internationalization, because the related measures are symmetric. We report these 
estimates only once (columns from 3 to 6). On the other hand, InvAppij ≠ InvAppji – see the 
discussion in Section 2 – so that variables indexed i and j will not have the same impact on 
the more general measure of internationalization. 
Odd-numbered columns are on the whole group of 42 countries, while even-
numbered columns show the results for the group of 14 European countries5. Sharing a 
common border and a common language has a significantly positive effect on all  types of 
international inventive collaboration. Distance is found to negatively affect international 
collaboration, with an elasticity that, for the broader group of countries and for InvApp 
internationalization, is approximately equal to 25%. For all types of internationalization, we 
find higher estimates when we consider the subset of European countries. Being a member 
of the European Union, or of the European Monetary Union, also positively affects the 
level of internationalization. The measure of inventive proximity, Tech, positively 
influences InvApp and InvInv internationalization, while for the infrequent cases of 
AppApp internationalization the sign of the impact depends on whether we focus on the 
whole set of countries, or on the smaller subset.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
The variables expressing cultural distance generally are significant and with the 
expected sign. Language sim has a stronger estimated effect on the larger group of 
countries. Its effect is estimated to be negative in the case of AppApp internationalization 
in the subset of European countries. The effect of Religion sim if for the most estimated to 
be positive. Trust and Somatic dist, available only for the group of European countries, are 
for the most precisely estimated.  
The Poisson estimates indicate that, for the European sample, better IPR protection 
improves internationalization, in most cases. OLS estimates are contradictory, indicating in 
one case a negative effect of IPR protection. We similarly fail to find significant and 
unambiguous effects of the FDI variables, again with differences between the responses 
                                                 
5  Estimates have also been carried out on the whole set of countries that are currently member 
of the European Union (without the Trust and Somatic dist variables), with results that in all cases 
are similar to the ones obtained for the subgroup of 14 European countries. The results are available 
from the author. 
17 
provided by the two alternative estimators – the Poisson estimator indicating a positive 
effect of the outbound FDI stock and, on InvInv internationalization, a negative one of the 
inbound stock. 
 
To appreciate any change in time of the estimates of the distance elasticity, we 
estimate the gravity model separately for each year, using both estimators, and on both 
samples. We exclude from the list of regressors IPRij  and the eight variables representing 
FDI flows and stocks, considering that we found their explanatory power to be limited. The 
full set of results (available from the author) indicate that, by and large, for most years we 
find the same results that emerged when pooling the 16 years of observations. In Table 5 
we provide a summary of the results. Focusing on the broader concept of 
internationalization, InvAppij, the yearly estimates of the distance elasticity are significant 
in between 11 and 14 years, depending on the sample and on the estimation method used.  
 We adopt a simple device aimed at representing the changes in time of the yearly 
estimates of the distance elasticity. Using weighted OLS, we estimate a bivariate regression 
where the independent variable is the set of estimated distance elasticities, a total of 16 of 
them, and the explanatory variable is time (expressed as years, from 1990 to 2005). The 
weight of each observation is set equal to each estimated distance elasticity divided by its 
standard error, so as to give more importance to those coefficients that are estimated with 
more precision. We carry out this exercise for all types of internationalization, with 
elasticities obtained using both types of estimators, and on both groups of countries. We 
report the results in Table 5, where the p-value is of the estimated coefficient of the time 
variable. The fitted line is then used to compute the predicted distance elasticities for the 
first and the last year of the period under considerations. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
 When we consider the group of 42 countries, the OLS estimates diminish 
significantly in time for the broader definition of international collaboration, InvAppij. The 
Poisson estimates, on the other hand, do not show any significant tendence to either 
increase or decrease during the period under considerations. Both OLS and Poisson 
estimates, on the other hand, concord in indicating that distance elasticities have increased 
in time for InvInv internationalization, and decreased for the infrequent cases of AppApp 
internationalization. The results of InvApp internationalization change significantly when 
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we obtain the estimated elasticities on the smaller group of European countries (lower part 
of Table 5). In these cases, unambiguously, we observe yearly estimates of the distance 
elasticity that are smaller in later years.  
 
5.   Discussion 
 
In this paper, we have discussed the extent, and researched the causes of, 
internationalization of innovative activities, using a dataset on priority patent applications 
filed at any patent office in the European Union, in the United States and in Japan between 
1990 and 2005. We found that the degree of internationalization of innovative activities, 
while increasing over time, is still relatively limited. Such a lasting "lack of globalization" 
may come as a surprise, at least if it is observed in the light of the amazing intricacy of the 
relations that govern today's international division of labor.  
R&D internationalization, however, is now more pronounced than it was 20 years 
ago. Much evidence, both of anecdotal, and of a more systematic nature, indicates that in 
the more recent years there was an important increase in off-shoring of R&D activities to 
countries such as China and India, with rationales shifting from the traditional “home-base 
exploiting” to “home-base expanding” motives. Our data, up to the year 2005, do not detect 
these changes, that possibly will take some time to manifest themselves in patent statistics.  
We stay away from the debate on what exactly are the emerging forms of global 
R&D efforts. Types of more open innovation, as described in Chesbrough (2003), are quite 
likely to be part of the story. However, adopting catchphrases to describe complex realities 
is risky and, in the case at hand, may conduce to confusion between the conceptually 
distinct ideas of “openness” and “internationalization” of innovative processes6. The whole 
issue, while certainly deserving the attention of researchers, is outside of the scope of our 
work.  
We studied the factors that determine the observed level of internationalization 
using a gravity model. From our results, it emerges unambiguously that distance negatively 
                                                 
6 For example, for some firms, constructing an ecosystem conducive to open models of 
innovation may be an alternative to more traditional off-shoring of tightly controlled R&D labs. 
That is, in some cases we may observe more openness leading to less internationalization. Evidence 
on emerging models of open innovation, mostly seen from the point of view of internationalization, 
is in OECD (2008). 
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affects the internationalization of R&D activities, both as expressed by the presence of a 
border in common between couple of countries and, most importantly, by physical distance, 
with estimated elasticities that are however sensibly lower than the ones usually found in 
the literature on international trade. We posited that the physical distance variable could 
proxy for a broadly defined concept of cultural distance, and in fact we found that variables 
meant to capture cultural distance are in most cases highly significant. However, these 
measures do not succeed in explaining the role of physical distance away. Just as in the 
debate on international trade, we find that physical distance matters in determining the 
strength of bilateral ties. 
Year-by-year estimates of the distance elasticity allowed us to appreciate its 
changes in time, although with the obvious caveat that the period under consideration, 16 
years, is certainly a narrow window for this type of exercise. We find evidence that the 
impact of distance on InvInv internationalization increased in time. A possible explanation 
of this finding would be the following. InvInv internationalization represents collaboration 
of inventors from different countries. Many impediments to international collaboration of 
various types have decreased over the last decades – think of the lower costs of travel and 
of telecommunications, and the increased ease with which tools such as videoconferencing 
permit the transmission of forms of tacit knowledge. These changes are reflected in the 
overall increase in internationalization that emerges from our data. However, we may argue 
that, during the same period, the importance of factors related to cultural distances 
(themselves correlated with physical distance) have remained roughly constant, so that their 
relative importance has increased. 
As for the other types of internationalization, and most importantly, for the more 
general InvApp type, the results depend on the group of countries that we analyze. The 
relevance of distance on InvApp internationalization may have increased when we observe 
the whole group of countries (also depending on the estimation method that we use), while 
we find stronger evidence that it decreased if we analyze the subset of European countries. 
Most cases of InvApp internationalization are the results of the activities of multinational 
firms abroad, as Table 3 shows. In this result, we may see the integrating effect of the 
European Union, whose impact is estimated to be positive in most specifications. The 
European Union is a policy bundle composed of many ingredients, among which we 
mention the presence of a common regulatory framework, a common market, and an 
innovation policy that, among other things, explicitly encourages international 
collaboration within the EU borders. Disentangling these effects, leading to a better 
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understanding of the interaction between public policies and the internationalization of 
inventive activities, is outside of the scope of the present work. 
We also tend to find a positive impact for a single important element of the 
European policy package, namely, being a member of the Euro Zone. This result is best 
seen in the light of the debate that followed the contribution of Rose (2000), who found a 
significant and economically very strong positive effect of currency zones on international 
trade. Later studies tended to confirm the presence of such an effect, but they significantly 
reduced its estimated size – see Baldwin (2006).  
Regardless of the changes in time that may have occurred, the estimated effect of 
distance on the internationalization in Europe is a robust conclusion of our work. One of the 
explicit policy goals of the European Commission is to encourage the formation of a 
“European research area”.7 We find that innovators in member states “naturally” decide to 
collaborate sensibly more frequently with like-minded innovators residing in countries that 
are physically and culturally close, that share a border and a language. Without proper 
incentives that alleviate the negative effect of distance, this may lead to a cozy integration 
among neighbors, a situation not necessarily corresponding to the type of “European 
research area” that policy makers have in mind. For this reason, the role of distance should 
enter the policy debate. 
 In Europe, the overall process of integration has reduced many of the impediments 
to international R&D collaboration. However, a process of integration may also reduce the 
motivations inducing firms to invest resources to carry out a process of internationalization. 
Market integration may make it less necessary to set up R&D labs abroad for traditional 
home-base exploiting motives – for example, there is less need to adapt one's products to 
foreign markets, if technical requirements are standardized. Also, the stronger protection of 
IPR that may follow a process of integration, may induce to locate (part) of the innovative 
process outside of the  boundaries of the firms, by relying more on market for technologies, 
and less on R&D labs abroad.  
                                                 
7 See for example the home page of European Commission’s DG Research (the Directorate 
General responsible for Science, Research and Technology), declaring that “European Research, 
and more specifically the creation of a European Research Area, are now high on the policy agenda 
in Europe”. (http://ec.europa.eu/research/index.cfm?pg=why&lg=en . Last accessed on 15 October 
2009). 
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 We fail to find unambiguous evidence of a significant role of IPR protection. The 
reasons could be many, but our discussion in the previous section suggests that the 
relationship between the protection of IPR and distinct types of internationalization of 
inventive activities is not a simple one, so that further work should be done to disentangle it 
– for example, by developing different measures for different aspects of IPR protection, and 
by disaggregating measures of internationalization according to some likely important 
characteristics, such as, the technological field and the type of applicant. We also failed to 
find an unambiguous effect of FDI, with results that also in part depended on the type of 
estimator chosen. Using bilateral FDI measures, that are notoriously scanty, would be an 
appropriate step better understand the nature of the relation. The fact that no obvious 
pattern emerges from our study, however, to some extent also confirms the relevance of the 
departure point that we chose for this paper: The internationalization of productive 
activities (of which FDI mostly talks), and the internationalization of inventive activities, 
are still two quite distinct sides of the globalization coin. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1.  Fractional counts of three fictitious patents 
 
 
 
Table 2. Computation of measures of internationalization of three fictitious patents 
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Table 3. Type of applicant vs. type of internationalization.  
Sample of 1000 international patents 
 
 Type of internationalization 
  InvApp and: 
Type of applicant Only InvApp Only InvInv Only AppApp InvInv & AppApp 
MNE HQ 71.0% 60.0% 48.8% 39.3% 
MNE SUB 12.8% 12.6% 43.9% 10.7% 
Firm 13.3% 18.3% 4.9% 17.9% 
Universities - 3.0% 2.4% - 
Public Res Inst 0.4% 3.5% - 7.1% 
Government 0.6% 0.3% - - 
Person 1.7% 2.2% -  25.0% 
 
Sums by column 100% 100,00% 100% 100% 
 
% in sample (n=1000) 53.1% 34.8% 6.5% 5.5% 
% in pop.  (N=224911) 55.6% 31.2% 6.9% 6.2% 
 
Pearson 
2χ  test on the independence of the two characters (18 degrees of freedom) =  145.9.  
P-value = 0.000 
 
Legend: 
Type of applicant:  A "Firm" is any firm, which is not a multinational corporation, or does not 
belong to one. MNC HQ: a Headquarter (HQ) of a multinational corporation (MNC), or a 
subsidiary, or a controlled firm, established in the same country as the headquarter. MNC SUB: a 
subsidiary of a MNE which is registered in a country different from HQ.  Person: a physical person. 
Public Res Inst: Research institute that are financed mostly by public administrations. University: 
Universities and other types of higher education institutions. 
Type of internationalization: see Section 2. 
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Table 4. OLS Regression results: The gravity model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES ln(InvApp) ln(InvApp) Ln(InvInv) ln(InvInv) ln(AppApp) ln(AppApp) 
ln(Invi) 0.550*** 0.235   
 (0.171) (0.147)   
ln(Invj)     
   
 
0.332** 
(0.161) 
 
0.0536 
(0.133) 
  
ln(Appi)     
     
ln(Appj) -0.250 0.145   
 (0.346) (0.173)   
 
0.564** 
(0.283) 
 
-0.111 
(0.375) 
ln(dist) -0.247*** -0.518*** -0.241*** -0.321*** -0.129*** -0.589*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0729) (0.0232) (0.0588) (0.0367) (0.0982) 
Border 0.639*** 0.393*** 0.682*** 0.678*** 0.739*** 0.339*** 
 (0.0575) (0.0884) (0.0466) (0.0722) (0.0717) (0.121) 
Com lang 0.297*** 0.781*** 0.682*** 0.985*** 0.120 1.895*** 
 (0.0892) (0.191) (0.0712) (0.158) (0.119) (0.274) 
EU Union 0.0500 0.612** 0.207*** 0.561*** 0.131 -0.284 
 (0.0679) (0.241) (0.0539) (0.194) (0.0902) (0.443) 
Euro Zone -0.102 0.325** 0.00556 0.143 -0.238** 0.834*** 
 (0.0902) (0.155) (0.0724) (0.124) (0.118) (0.209) 
Tech 0.719*** 0.274 0.757*** 0.443*** 0.396*** -0.808*** 
 (0.0840) (0.196) (0.0637) (0.156) (0.121) (0.305) 
Lang sim 1.228*** 0.328 0.931*** 0.0902 0.741*** -0.936*** 
 (0.0972) (0.228) (0.0807) (0.187) (0.133) (0.325) 
Religion sim 0.421*** 0.849*** -0.0971 0.235** 0.236 0.629*** 
 (0.108) (0.133) (0.0860) (0.106) (0.163) (0.234) 
Trust  0.487**  0.866***  1.056*** 
  (0.240)  (0.195)  (0.360) 
Somatic dist  -0.0720***  -0.0200  -0.0461 
  (0.0273)  (0.0224)  (0.0418) 
IPRi -1.318 -0.731 
 (0.976) (0.942) 
IPRj 0.301 1.077 
 (1.263) (0.716) 
 
-0.465 
(0.600) 
 
0.856 
(0.591) 
 
-2.725** 
(1.130) 
 
-1.141 
(1.683) 
ln(FDI flow out)i 0.247* 0.312 
 (0.147) (0.241) 
ln(FDI flow out)j -0.260** -0.688** 
 (0.133) (0.325) 
 
0.109 
(0.115) 
 
0.315 
(0.235) 
 
0.279 
(0.221) 
 
-0.563 
(0.543) 
ln(FDI flow in)i  0.315 0.387* 
 (0.236) (0.197) 
ln(FDI flow in)j 0.315 0.485** 
 (0.236) (0.194) 
 
0.130 
(0.146) 
 
-0.0799 
(0.135) 
 
0.203 
(0.329) 
 
0.621 
(0.396) 
ln(FDI stock out)i 0.375 -0.0356 
 (0.288) (0.394) 
ln(FDI stock out)j 0.388 0.539 
 (0.246) (0.332) 
 
0.0208 
(0.184) 
 
-0.373 
(0.285) 
 
0.198 
(0.540) 
 
-0.303 
(0.734) 
ln(FDI stock in)i  -0.0953 -0.151 
 (0.138) (0.362) 
ln(FDI stock in)j -0.435** 0.234 
 (0.179) (0.413) 
 
0.0527 
(0.109) 
 
0.518* 
(0.286) 
 
-0.259 
(0.298) 
 
2.254*** 
(0.722) 
       
Observations 6314 1854 6916 1890 3986 1244 
R-squared 0.749 0.791 0.768 0.832 0.644 0.745 
Notes: 
Columns: 1, 3 & 5: All (42) countries; 2, 4 & 6: Subset of EU countries, plus Norway (14 countries). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Time-varying fixed country effects included in the regression. Years considered: 1990-2005 
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Table  5.  Regression results: Changes in time of the distance elasticity. Weighted OLS 
 
 
 OLS POISSON 
Type of 
internationalization 
InvApp InvInv AppApp InvApp InvInv AppApp 
42 countries       
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.451 0.000 0.000 
Significant estimates 11 13 7 14 16 10 
R2 0.476 0.611 0.306 0.014 0.510 0.783 
Implied elasticity, 1990 -0.157 -0.071 -0.364 -0.284 -0.196 -0.880 
Implied elasticity, 2005 -0.329 -0.437 0.324 -0.261 -0.370 +0.052 
14 countries       
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.003 0.378 0.000 
Significant estimates 14 9 5 14 11 12 
R2 0.504 0.491 0.309 0.165 0.018 0.728 
Implied elasticity, 1990 -0.879 0.154 -1.392 -0.721 -0.360 -1.339 
Implied elasticity, 2005 -0.481 -0.709 -0.365 -0.494 -0.416 -0.213 
 
Notes:  
n=16. p-value of the estimated slope of a regression having the estimates of the distance elasticities 
(by year), as the dependent variable, and time as the explanatory variable. 
The weights are equal to the estimated coefficient of ln(dist_km), divided by its estimated standard 
error. Implied elasticities are computed as the forecasts of the distance elasticities for the first and 
the last years of the period under consideration. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. International patent, EU27, national averages 
 
     EU27 national average                         United States                                Japan 
 
 
Notes:  
InvInv | Inv: Eq. 8; AppApp | App: Eq. 8'; InvApp | Inv: Eq. 9; AppInv | App: Eq. 9' 
Source of the data: Analysis of the Patstat database (April 2009 release) (See Section 3 for a 
description). 
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APPENDIX 
 
A. The countries considered for the analysis. 
 
Measures of the internationalization of inventive activities have been computed for a total 
of 42 countries. These are:  
 All OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States);  
 Countries “invited […] to open discussions for membership to the [OECD]: Brazil, 
China, India, Indonesia and South Africa;  
 Countries included into the “roadmaps” [marking] the start of accession talk [to the 
OECD]: Chile, Israel and Russia and (from the site of the OECD, accessed on 15 October 
2009); Estonia and Slovenia also belong this group, but they have not be considered for 
problems of data coverage. 
 Countries that, while not belonging to the groups above, are part of the European 
Union (with the exclusion of Cyprus and of Malta, whose patenting activities are either 
zero or negligible): Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania; Latvia also belong to this group, but 
it has not be considered for problems of data coverage. 
 Taiwan. 
 
 The gravity model is also estimated on a group of 14 countries, for which the Trust 
and Somatic dist variables also available. These are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom.  
 
B. Definition of variables and data sources. 
 
Tech. The technological proximity variable is computed considering the eight top 
"sections" (A through H) of the International Patent Classification (IPC) taxonomy. See 
http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/ (last accessed on 15 October 2009). The 
correlations are computed for each year on the same dataset used for all the exercises 
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carried out in the paper. Fractional counting is adopted to address all the cases when more 
than one IPC category is assigned to a patent. 
Com lang. It is equal to 1 if two countries the same language is spoken, 0 otherwise, and it 
takes fractional values for multilingual countries. For example, it is equal to one half 
between Belgium and France (the presence of a small German speaking minority in 
Belgium is ignored), and to one third for the pairs of Switzerland with Germany, France 
and Italy.  
Trust. From Guiso et al. (2009), based on the Eurobarometer survey. 
Som dist. It is based on the distance between a set of four anthropometric measures. The 
source is Guiso et al (2009). 
Lang sim. The similarity between couple of languages is computed using data from the 
Ethnologe Project (http://www.ethnologue.com/), as collected and organized by James 
Fearon (see Fearon, 2003). The similarity between two languages is based on the distance 
between “tree branches” (“for example [...] Byelorussian, Russian and Ucrainian share their 
first three classifications as Indo-European, Slavic, East Branch languages”; Fearon, 2003). 
Unlike in Fearon’s work, who obtains his measure by dividing the number of branches that 
are in common by the maximum number of branches that any language has (which is equal 
to 15), we divide by the maximum number of branches of each couple of language, so as to 
take into account that the granularity of the branch definition may be not the same across 
languages.  
Religion dist. It is the probability that two persons in different countries belong to the same 
broad group of religions. The computation is based on data from the World Value Survey 
(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/), integrated with data from the CIA World Factbook 
for the countries not covered therein. 
IPR. The source of the data, available for 1995, 2000, 2005 and an average of 1960-1990, is 
Park (2008). For the years 1990, 1991 and 1992, the 1960-1990 average has been used.  
The years 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1997 are set equal to the observation for 1995. The 
observation for year 2000 is also used for the years 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002. Last, the 
observation for year 2005 is also used for the years 2003 and 2004.  
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Table A.1. Poisson estimates  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES InvApp InvApp InvInv InvInv AppApp AppApp 
       
ln(Invi) 0.418*** 0.337***   
 (0.0630) (0.111)   
ln(Invj)     
   
 
0.431*** 
(0.0590) 
 
0.115 
(0.105) 
  
ln(Appi)     
     
ln(Appj) 0.541*** 0.383***   
 (0.0884) (0.134)   
 
0.551*** 
(0.128) 
 
0.254 
(0.220) 
ln(dist) -0.252*** -0.470*** -0.332*** -0.394*** -0.342*** -0.670*** 
 (0.0298) (0.0526) (0.0198) (0.0397) (0.0422) (0.0853) 
Border 0.356*** 0.190*** 0.519*** 0.498*** 0.850*** 0.202 
 (0.0566) (0.0691) (0.0381) (0.0535) (0.0916) (0.135) 
Com lang 0.252** 1.082*** 0.398*** 1.361*** -0.197 2.960*** 
 (0.102) (0.136) (0.0633) (0.133) (0.162) (0.275) 
EU Union 0.210*** 0.304*** 0.198*** -0.169** 0.194 0.155 
 (0.0600) (0.0853) (0.0448) (0.0726) (0.118) (0.243) 
Euro Zone 0.0438 0.242*** 0.0246 -0.00351 -0.240* 0.430*** 
 (0.0681) (0.0711) (0.0352) (0.0440) (0.134) (0.119) 
Tech 1.004*** 0.497*** 1.033*** -0.165 1.199*** -1.397*** 
 (0.0936) (0.171) (0.0543) (0.152) (0.163) (0.385) 
Lang sim 0.586*** 0.243 0.554*** 0.231** 0.358 -1.334*** 
 (0.130) (0.162) (0.100) (0.105) (0.230) (0.252) 
Religion sim -0.0890 0.537*** -0.743*** -0.669*** 0.492** 0.971*** 
 (0.160) (0.196) (0.0971) (0.133) (0.239) (0.303) 
Trust  1.823***  0.843***  -0.0891 
  (0.193)  (0.151)  (0.365) 
Somatic dist  -0.0582**  -0.0697***  -0.458*** 
  (0.0252)  (0.0263)  (0.0502) 
IPRi 0.0918 0.367* 
 (0.0671) (0.190) 
IPRj 0.0846 0.584*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0436) 
 
0.120** 
(0.0538) 
 
0.328** 
(0.162) 
 
0.159 
(0.117) 
 
1.314*** 
(0.334) 
ln(FDI flow out)I  0.00567 -0.0435 
 (0.0221) (0.0335) 
ln(FDI flow out)j -0.0137 -0.0301 
 (0.0284) (0.0322) 
 
-0.0315**
(0.0150) 
 
-0.00445 
(0.0224) 
 
-0.0785** 
(0.0399) 
 
-0.132 
(0.0911) 
ln(FDI flow in)i  0.0109 -0.00270 
 (0.0230) (0.0262) 
ln(FDI flow in)j 0.00905 -0.0665**
 (0.0224) (0.0318) 
 
0.0268* 
(0.0162) 
 
0.00718 
(0.0184) 
 
0.0586 
(0.0372) 
 
0.0833 
(0.0520) 
ln(FDI stock out)i  0.204*** 0.225** 
 (0.0636) (0.112) 
ln(FDI stock out)j 0.0329 0.148 
 (0.0862) (0.140) 
 
0.164*** 
(0.0470) 
 
0.247*** 
(0.0881) 
 
0.342*** 
(0.100) 
 
0.0893 
(0.254) 
ln(FDI stock in)i  -0.152*** -0.132 
 (0.0520) (0.115) 
ln(FDI stock in)j 0.133* 0.304*** 
 (0.0807) (0.118) 
 
-0.148***
(0.0357) 
 
-0.253*** 
(0.0972) 
 
-0.211** 
(0.0848) 
 
0.0326 
(0.255) 
       
Observations 16730 2620 16730 2620 16730 2620 
R-squared 0.906 0.900 0.665 0.651 0.579 0.354 
Notes: 
Columns: 1, 3 & 5: All (42) countries; 2, 4 & 6: Subset of EU countries, plus Norway (14 countries). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Time-varying fixed country effects included in the regression. Years considered: 1990-2005 
